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ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Appellants 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
RICHARD D. MADSEN and 
NANCY MADSEN, his wife, 
BOYD A. SV5ENSEN and BEATRICE 
SWENSEN, his wife, HOPE 
A. HILTON, BLAINE ANDERSON 
and SHEREE ANDERSON, his wife, 
CYNTHIA HILTON, RALPH M. 
HILTON, GENE HELLAND and 
the MIDDLE EAST FOUNDATION, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs, 
MIRVIN D. BORTHICK, W. SMOOT 
BRIMHALL, and JOHN DOES 
I TO V, being former 
Commissioners of the Utah 
Department of Financial 
Institutions, 
Defendants/Respondents, 
FIRST PETITION FOR 
JUDICIAL NOTICE 
Case No. 19704 
(5^323 
& "*Kr2T & S F * & T ^ 
JUN2 07986 
Cfcrk, Supreme Court, Utah 
During oral argument, Justice Zimmerman asked a 
question with respect to the following language from Madsen 
v, Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 631 (Utah 1983): 
While plaintiffs1 allegations that 
defendant Borthick had "wholly failed to 
discharge" his statutory duties and 
responsibilities might be construed as 
an allegation of a negligent omission, 
plaintiffs expressly disavowed that 
construction by conceding in the 
district court that the cause of action 
did not fall under any of the statutory 
exceptions to immunity, [Emphasis 
added.] 
In order to more fully respond to that question, 
plaintiffs ask the Court to take judicial notice of the 
pleadings in the underlying case. (Exhibits A and B here-
to.) 
From these pleadings, it appears that there was no 
binding concession in the trial court. The State of Utah 
had based it's motion squarely and solely on the failure to 
file a notice of claim. At most, plaintiffs conceded that, 
"It appears that plaintiffs1 claim does not fall under any 
of those statutory exceptions [to governmental immunity]." 
(See Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss, Exhibit A, at p. 1.) 
Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the 
proceeding. Rule 201(f), Utah Pules of Evidence, 
2 
Since the only issue before the trial court was 
failure to file the notice of claim, the dismissal of the 
2 
lawsuit had to be based on that sole (procedural) reason, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /$ day of 
:
- -/,//?if * 1986. 
ROBERT J, DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys... for Appellants
 ? 
J-
i / / > 
By: / {.gHsU** (". 
2 
The true reason that plaintiffs failed to file a notice 
of claim below was a tactical decision: 
Counsel for plaintiffs advised the Court in 
his brief and at oral argument that he did 
not wish to base his cause of action on any 
exception to the Governmental 
Immunity Act since this might subject the 
depositors (1) to a ceiling on the amount 
of their recovery (§ 63-30-34) , (2) to a 
substantial problem of class certification, 
and (3) to a shorter statute of limitations 
than would apply if their cause of action 
were rooted in a common-law claim (e.g., 
compare § 78-12-26(4) with § 78-12-25(2)). 
Madsen v. Borthick, supra at p. 631 n. 
1. 
3 
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Exhibit A 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN J. SORENSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
115 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: 533-6684 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD D. MADSEN and 
NANCY MADSEN, his wife; 
BOYD A. SWENSEN and BEATRICE 
SWENSEN, his wife; HOPE A. 
HILTON; BLAINE ANDERSON and 
SHEREE ANDERSON, his wife; 
CYNTHIA HILTON; RALPH M. 
HILTON; MIDDLE EAST FOUNDA-
TION; and GENE A. HELLAND, 
on behalf of themselves and 
all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs , MOTION TO DISMISS 
MIRVJ.N D. BORTIIICK, Commis-
sioner of the Utah Department 
of Financial Institutions; and 
the STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. C-81-1790 
COME NOW the defendants in the above-entitled matter 
by and through their attorney, Stephen J. Sorenson, Assistant 
Attorney General, and move the Court for an order dismissing 
this action on the grounds that the plaintiffs have failed to 
comply or to allege compliance with provisions of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, Sections 63-30-1 et seq. , Utah Code 
Annotated, 195 3, as amended. 
The basis for this Motion is more fully set out in the 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on file 
herein. The defendants expressly preserve any and all other bases 
for dismissal of this action which they may subsequently wish 
to rely upon, should this action survive or be brought again. 
DATED this day of , 1981. 
STEPHEN J^SORENSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
-2-
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN J. SORENSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
115 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: 533-6684 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD D. MADSEN and 
NANCY MADSEN, his wife; 
BOYD A. SWENSEN and BEATRICE 
SWENSEN, his wife; HOPE A. 
HILTON; BLAINE ANDERSON and 
SHEREE ANDERSON, his wife; 
CYNTHIA HILTON; RALPH M. 
HILTON; MIDDLE EAST FOUNDA-
TION; and GENE A. HELLAND, 
on behalf of themselves and 
all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
MIRVIN D. BORTHICK, Commis-
sioner of the Utah Department 
of Financial Institutions; and 
the STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. C-81-1790 
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CLAIM REQUIREMENTS 
OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT OR TO 
ALLEGE COMPLIANCE WITH THOSE REQUIREMENTS IS 
FATAL TO THE PLAINTIFFS' ACTION, AND THEIR 
COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED. 
Utah Code AnnuLatod, Soction 6 3-30-11, a uaction oi 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, states in pertinent part: 
Any porson having a claim for injury to 
person or property against a governmental entity 
or its employee shall, before maintaining an 
action under this act, file a written notice of 
claim with such entity for appropriate relief in-
cluding money damages. The notice of claim shall 
set forth a brief statement of the facts and the 
nature of the claim asserted, shall be signed 
by the person making the claim or such person's 
agent, attorney, parent or legal guardian, and 
shall be directed and delivered to the responsible 
governmental entity within the time prescribed in 
section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13, as applicable. 
Regarding the time period in which a claim against the State must 
be filed, Utah Code Annotated, Section 6 3-30-12 provides: 
A claim against the state is barred unless 
notice of claim is filed with the attorney general 
and the agency concerned within one year after the 
cause of action arises. 
Therefore, as a condition precedent to maintaining an action 
against the State of Utah or its employee, a plaintiff must have 
filed a written notice of claim with the State within one year 
after the purported cause of action arises. 
In the instant matter, the defendants are the State of 
Utah and Mirvin D. Borthick, an employee of the State for whom 
the State is providing legal representation pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 63-48-3. The plaintiffs have filed no notice 
of claim, either with the Utah Attorney General's Office or with 
the Utah Department of Financial Institutions, of which Mr. Borthick 
is Commissioner, and their Complaint fails to allege that any such 
notice has been made. 
In Sears v. Southworth, 563 P.2d 192 (Utah, 1977), the 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the notice requirement under 
equal protection attack, finding the requirement rationally based 
in allowing governmental units promptly to investigate claims and 
remedy defects, avoiding unnecessary litigation, and minimizing 
difficulties arising from changes in administrations. The Court 
also reaffirmed the principle that knowledge by government employees 
of circumstances surrounding a claim does not dispense with the 
necessity of filing a timely written claim. The Court has also 
found an adequate basis for dismissal of a complaint the failure 
to allege compliance with the notice requirements, both where only 
-2-
the State was the defendant, Walton v. State Road Commission, 
558 P.2d 608 (Utah, 1976), and where both a state commission 
and its chairman were defendants, Roosendaal Construction & 
Mining Corp. v. Holman, 28 Utah 2d 396, 503 P.2d 446 (1972). 
The statutoryt directive is clear and of settled validity, 
and the plaintiffs' failure to follow the claim procedure requires 
that this action be dismissed. 
DATED this S-7fl{ day of Mfof&JA , 1981. 
^^-^ST^E^HEN JOSORENSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
-3-
Exhibit B 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
2040 East 4800 South, Suite 203 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 278-4439 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD D. MADSEN and 
NANCY MADSEN, his wife, 
BOYD A SWENSKN and 
BEATRICE SWENSEN, his wife, 
HOPE A. HILTON, BLAINE ANDERSON 
and SHEREE ANDERSON, his wife, 
CNYTHIA HILTON, RALPH M. HILTON, 
MIDDLE EAST FOUNDATION and 
GENE A. HELLAND, on behalf of 
themselves and all others 
similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MIRVIN D. BORTHICK, Commissioner 
of the Utah Department of 
Financial Institutions, and the 
STATE OF UTAH, 
DeCendants. 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs seek to sue the State of Utah. Defendants 
move to dismiss on the basis of governmental immunity. Defend-
ants argue that the state is absolutely immune from suit except 
as consent has been given under the Governmental Immunity Act 
(§63-30-1 et. seq. U.C.A.). Defendants further arque that 
plaintiffs cannot take advantage of the Act because they have 
failed to file the statutory notice pursuant to §63-30-11 U.C.A. 
However, there is good reason why plaintiffs did not 
file notice under the Act. The Act is not a blanket authorization 
to sue the state in all instances. The Act permits suit only in 
certain limited cases. See §63-30-5 through 10 U.C.A. It appears 
that plaintiffs' claim does not fall under any of those statutory 
exceptions. 
Thus plaintiffs have no cause of action under the 
statute. And there was no reason to file a notice claim pursuant 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
Civil No. C-81-1790 
~~ _»»«.: i>uuLULu. Katiiur, plaintiffs seek Lu establish a non* 
statutory cause of action. Plaintiffs may pursue that non-
statutory claim without filing notice under the statute 
(§60-30-11 U.C.A.) El Rancho Enterprises v Murray City Corp. 
565 P.2d 778 (Ut. 1977). 
POINT ONE 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BY 
STATUTORY IMMUNITY 
One source of governmental immunity is the statute 
itself. However, the legislature only adopted part of the common 
law doctrine of governmental immunity. Here is the operative 
language: 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
Act, all governmental entities shall be immune 
from suit for any injury which may result from 
the activities of said entities wherein said 
entity is engaged in the exercise and discharge 
of a governmental function. §60-30-3 U.C.A. 
The key words are: exercise and discharge of a 
governmental function. In other words, governmental immunity is 
preserved where the state exercises or discharges some govern-
mental act. However, immunity is not preserved where the state 
fails to exercise or discharge some governmental net. Thun, Arts 
of commission fall under the statute. Acts of omission do not. 
This analysis is confirmed by using the tool of 
statutory construction known as Expressio unis est exclusio 
alterius -- Express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of 
others. Of similar import, see Expressum facit cessare taciturn. 
The rule has been described as follows: 
The oldest law of the Romans recognized no 
will as in existence other than the spoken 
will, the dictum. What is not spoken is not 
willed, and vice versa, only that is willed 
that is spoken. 
2 Danz, Geschichte des Romischen Rechts S14 2 
This maxim has been widely employ oil ar. a too] of 
statutory construction. See, e.q., 
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 13 7, 175; 
Ex Parte McCardle, 7 Wall 506 (1868); 
Lukens Steel Co. v. Perkins, 107 F.2d 627, 640 
(App. D.C. 1939) ; 
Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n. of Independent Ins. Agents, 
399 F.2d 1010, 1013, 1014 (5th Circ. 1968); 
Hawkeye Chemical Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine 
Ins. Co., 510 F.2d 322, 327 (7th Cir. 1975). 
The statute clearly covers acts of commission. By 
applying the maxim, we see that acts of omission are excluded 
from the statute. 
P1 a i n t i f f s c 1 a i m, 11 I a t 11 i e s t a t e 1 i a s f a i ] e d c r o m i tt e_d 
to supervise the Grove Fi nance ComjJa i iy as rec}u ired by s t a tu te. 
(See Complaint). Since the Governmental Immunity Act does not 
confer immunity for omission, plaintiffs claim is not barred by 
the Act. 
POINT TWO 
PLAINTIFFS CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BY 
COMMON LAW GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
There are two sources of government a 1 inirnuni ty : th e 
statute (Governmental Immunity Act) and the common law. 
We have seen in Point One that plaintiffs' claim, is not 
barred by statutory governmental immunity. However, plaintiffs' 
claim is still subject to dismissal if it falis under the common 
law grant of governmental immunity. 
Utah courts have long espoused the common law doctrine 
of governmental i mmunity. However, the doctrine has been adopted 
with little or no critical analysis. The time has come for a 
reappraisal. 
The entire concept of governmental immunity is an 
historical accident. A majority of jurisdictions have judicially 
abolished the doctrine in some degree. Jones v State Highway Comm 
557 S.W.2d 225, 227 N.l (Mo. 1977) lists 29 states which have 
judicially abolished or modif ied the doctrine . Comm.entators have 
almost unanimously rejected the doctrine. Borchard, Government 
T,i nbili t> it i T< ) r \ (T-VTTT). 3 4 Yale L.'j. ], 757, 1039 (1926), 28 
C o i 11m . I... \<f: v . ', 7 / , 7 i -I ( 1 l() 2 H ) ; i'" r< ).:; s <•i' , T(">' l :; • > ! * ' •1! 'r; ° '] n j [ A ' ! ] 
ed. ] 9 7.1) ; Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of 
Change, 1966 U.Ill.L.R. 91 9. 
_ 3 _ 
The p ro b 1 em i s t h a t t h e c o c t r i n e c f cover rx: en t a 1 
immunity was imported from England. However, as the Supreme 
Court of 111inois has stated: 
" ..in preserving the sovereign immunity 
theory, 'courts have overlooked the fact that 
the Revolutionary War was fought to abolish 
that 'divine right of Ki rigs' on which the 
theory is based. " 
Moliter v Kancland <'emm.i:i t t y Unit P : s t: . [k;. '. ,. , . \. :'...•! -,r . ' 
(111. 1959). See also M a y I e v P e n n s y 1 v a n i. a Do p t , o: J^^hwayj^, -E 
A. 2d 70 9 (Penn. .19 78) 
Therefore, 11: Ie cour t s 1 Iou] d judicially abo1ish what 
remains of governmental immunity. 
POINT TIIHEU 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY - - WHETHER BY 
STATUTE OR COMMON LAW --IS UNCON-
STITUTIONAL 
Article 1 §11 of the Utah Constitution states: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for 
an injury done to him in his person, property or 
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of 
law, which shall be administered without denial 
or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any 
tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, 
any civil cause to which he is a party. 
That section is -- on its face - • the antithesis of 
doctrine of governmental immunity. Under governmental immunity, 
citizens do not have a "rernedy by d•.;e cou.rse of 1 aw" if they a.re 
wronged by 'the state. 
Of course, the Governmental Immunity Act par11y 1ifts 
the curtain. Under the Act., certain claims may be made against 
the state "by due course of law." However, there are many claims 
which are not waived by the Governmen t a 1 I mm u n i t y A c t. The Act. 
provides for suits against the state in limited areas. However, 
e x c e p t f o r t h o s e ] i m i t e d a, r e a s , g o v e r n m e n, t a. ] i. mm u n i t y r e in a i n. s a n 
abso] ute bar 
- §63-30-5 Contract obligations waived 
§63-30-6 Real property claims waived 
§63-30-7 Negligent operation of vehicles waived 
§63-30-8 Defective highway conditions waived 
§63-30-9 Defective public buildings waived 
§63-3 0-10 Negligent act of employee partially waived 
-4-
"Except as may be provided m tins act, all 
governmental entities shall be immune from 
suit..." §63-30-3 U.C.A. 
Thus, the Governmental Immunity Act is certainly 
constitutional insofar as it permits some claims to be made 
against the state. 'However., the Act is unconstitutional (under 
Arti c1e I, Section 11) i nsofar as other c1a ims are prohibited. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants seek to have plaintiffs* claim dismissed 
because no claim was filed pursuant to §63-30-11 U.C.A. However, 
plaintiffs' claim is not barred by the Gove rnmen t a 1 Immu r. 11 y A c t. 
Moreove r » t he en t: : v ^\ Ni:c c"• p t ^ : ;^ .Nv c r: i r - er. t :i I : ~rr:i::*:: y *; > „i i-
anachronism and unconst i tut iona 1. Theref o re , the re was nev*er any 
reason for plaintiffs to file notice under the Governmental 
Immunity Act. 
DATED this _^3^ day of /$yO^/ , 19 81. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
A1t:ornov f or P1 a i n t^ f f r 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing 
Memorandum, in Opposition to Defendants* Motion to Dismiss was 
mailed, postage prepaid, to Stephen J. Sorenson, Assistant 
Attorney General, attorney for defendants, LIS Ft ate Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, nt-ah «41J4 t h i - *~$& _ day of
 : tjjjz-t. { , 1 981 
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